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 Abstract 
 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are unique and controversial participants in the housing 
finance system of the United States.  Because of these enterprises' federal government charters, the 
financial markets believe that the government would not allow Fannie and Freddie to fail to honor 
their debt obligations, and they are thereby able to borrow more cheaply in credit markets; in turn, 
they lower interest rates for residential mortgages.  If the financial markets are right, however, 
Freddie and Fannie also create a contingent liability for the government.  Though there are positive 
externalities from home ownership, the Fannie/Freddie route is far too broad and unfocused to 
address those externalities effectively.  Privatization, accompanied by targeted federal assistance for 
potential first-time low- and moderate-income home buyers, would be a superior policy direction. 
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1. Introduction 
 Public policy discussions invariably occur -- or should occur -- in the context of the second 
best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956-1957).  When one or more non-trivial market imperfections are 
already present, the social welfare consequences of an additional apparent market imperfection 
cannot automatically be predicted. 
 The continuing policy discussions concerning Fannie Mae (the Federal National Mortgage 
Association) and Freddie Mac (the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation), and their special 
status, are no exception.  Since the 1930s the federal government has had an array of programs, 
incentives, and institutions to encourage housing and especially to encourage home ownership; 
Fannie and Freddie are just two such vehicles for encouragement among many.  And home 
ownership itself may well convey positive externalities for American society, which might justify 
some encouragement -- although very likely not as much and not as broad as is actually provided. 
 Accordingly, a discussion of Fannie and Freddie should consider the larger context of 
housing policy in which they are embedded, as well as considering their roles and net effects.  
Efficiency and distribution both matter.  And an analysis of net effects necessarily involves 
(implicitly, if not explicitly) a counter-factual or "but for" scenario of what the world would look 
like if their special status did not exist today.1 
                                                           
     * As part of his duties as Board Member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the author was 
also a director of Freddie Mac from November 1986 through August 1989. 
     1 Counter-factual historical scenarios as to how the residential mortgage markets might have 
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 It is these tasks that will be attempted in this paper. 
 
2. Fannie and Freddie: the basics 
 Fannie May and Freddie Mac are undeniably unique and peculiar institutions.  They are 
both creatures of the federal government.  Fannie Mae was created in 1938; Freddie Mac was 
created in 1970.  Their structures evolved over time.2  Today, they are largely similar:  They are 
federally chartered corporations, with narrow federal mandates -- to provide finance for single- and 
multi-family housing -- but they are publicly traded companies with private shareholders.  Their 
boards of directors each include five directors (out of eighteen) that are selected by the President of 
the United States.  A common description is that they are "government sponsored enterprises" 
(GSEs).3 
 Fannie and Freddie are the only two enterprises that have received this special housing 
finance charter from the federal government.  By contrast, commercial bank and thrift (savings 
institution) charters, with their attendant federal deposit insurance, are readily available from the 
federal government or the states, so long as the applicants can demonstrate that they are competent 
(i.e., have acceptable business plans), have sufficient initial capital, and are of good character (i.e., 
are not felons).  At year-end 2000 there were 8,315 chartered commercial banks and 1,590 
chartered thrifts in operation, while 192 new banks and 43 new thrifts began operation during the 
calendar year. 
                                                                                                                                                             
developed in the absence of the establishment of Fannie and Freddie may be interesting for larger, 
long-term policy development, but they offer little guidance for the immediate questions 
surrounding their current roles and possible changes in their status. 
     2 See, for example, Tucillo (1983), Weicher (1994, 2000) and Woodward (2001) for discussions 
of their evolution. 
     3 Three other GSEs exist: the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS); the Farm Credit 
Administration; and Farmer Mac.  A former GSE (Sallie Mae) was privatized in the late 1990s. 
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 Both Fannie and Freddie are sizable entities.  As of year-end 2000, Fannie had $675 billion 
in assets; Freddie had $459 billion in assets.  When ranked by assets, they were the third- and fifth-
largest "private" enterprises in the U.S.4  In addition, Fannie had outstanding $707 billion in pass-
through mortgage backed securities (MBSs) that carry its guarantee, while Freddie had $576 billion. 
 The market values of their publicly traded equity shares at year-end 2000 were $75 billion and $42 
billion, making them the 31st and 58th largest publicly traded companies. 
 Both companies grew rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s, as the data in Table 1 indicate.  
Especially striking was the growth in their MBSs outstanding during the 1980s and then the growth 
in their on-balance-sheet residential mortgages held as assets in their portfolios in the 1990s. 
 As GSEs, Fannie and Freddie enjoy the following advantages: 
 -- Despite specific disclaimers to the contrary,5 the securities markets treat the debt 
securities (directly issued debt and MBSs) of Fannie and Freddie as (very likely) carrying a federal 
guarantee; Fannie and Freddie thereby enjoy lower financing costs than would otherwise be the case 
(but not quite as low as the U.S. Government itself); 
 -- They have had lower capital (net worth) requirements for holding residential mortgages in 
their portfolios than has been true for banks and thrifts;6 
 -- They are exempt from state and local taxes; 
 -- Their securities are exempt from the Securities and Exchange Commission's registration 
requirements and fees; 
                                                           
     4 This ranking is found in Forbes, April 16, 2001, p. 248; it excludes another GSE, the Federal 
Home Loan Bank System, which had $654 billion in assets. 
     5 The prospectuses for all Fannie and Freddie securities explicitly state that they are not 
guaranteed by the U.S. Government. 
     6 As is discussed below, since 1992 Fannie and Freddie have had a capital requirement of 2.5% 
for holding mortgages in portfolio; since 1989 banks and thrifts have had a capital requirement of 
4% for holding mortgages. 
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 -- The U.S. Treasury is authorized to lend each up to $2.25 billion; 
 -- They can use the Federal Reserve as their fiscal agent; 
 -- Their debt is eligible for use as collateral for public deposits, for purchase by the Federal 
Reserve in open-market operations, and for unlimited investment by banks and thrifts; 
 -- Their MBSs, when held by U.S. banks and thrifts, carry a capital (net worth) requirement 
of only 1.6%, rather than the capital requirement of 4% that the underlying mortgages themselves 
would require if held by a bank or thrift; 
 -- Their securities are explicitly government securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934; and 
 -- Their securities are exempt from the provisions of many state investor protection laws. 
 The first of these advantages provides the most value to Fannie and Freddie; but that 
advantage flows, at least in part, from the other special provisions and the aura that they convey, as 
well as from these GSEs' federal charters themselves. 
 Fannie and Freddie are also subject to major limitations: 
 -- They are restricted to the business of providing residential mortgage finance; they cannot 
originate mortgages; 
 -- There is a maximum size of mortgage, linked to an annual index of housing prices, that 
they can finance; for 2001 that maximum (for single-family homes) is $275,000;7 
 -- The mortgages must have at least a 20% down payment (i.e., a maximum of an 80% loan-
to-value) ratio, or a credit enhancement (such as mortgage insurance); and 
                                                           
     7 Mortgages within the maximum are usually described as "qualifying" or "conforming" 
mortgages; larger "non-conforming" mortgages are "jumbos".  Also, the limit is 50% higher in 
Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.  It is worth noting that in 2000 (when the 
Fannie/Freddie conforming mortgage limit was $252,700) the median sales price for a new home 
was $168,500 and the median sales price for an existing home was $139,000; 80% loan-to-value 
mortgages on those medians would have been $134,800 and $111,200, respectively.  Only 17% of 
all single-family mortgages were jumbos. 
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 -- They are subject to oversight regulation by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) and to safety-and-soundness regulation -- e.g., minimum capital requirements 
and annual examinations -- by HUD's Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). 
 Their participation in the residential mortgage8 markets takes two forms:  First, they buy 
and hold residential mortgages in their own portfolios; they fund these purchases overwhelmingly 
with debt.  Of Fannie's $675 billion in assets at year-end 2000, 90% was invested in mortgages; of 
Freddie's $459 billion, 84% was in mortgages.  The liabilities of each were composed of 97% debt 
and only 3% equity. 
 Second, they purchase residential mortgages from originators, create securities (MBSs) 
from bundles of the mortgages, and sell the securities to investors with guarantees as to the timely 
payment of interest and principal; i.e., Fannie and Freddie have absorbed the credit risk of these 
mortgages.  As mentioned above, at year-end 2000 the amounts of MBSs outstanding for Fannie 
and Freddie were $707 billion and $576 billion, respectively.  They thereby create a large secondary 
market in residential mortgages. 
 The structure of the mortgage market is thus quite different today as compared with, say, 
three decades ago (White 1991; Weicher 1994).  Then, mortgage finance was largely a wholly 
vertically integrated process: banks and thrifts were the primary originators of residential 
mortgages; they kept the mortgages in their portfolios, financed almost entirely by deposits; and 
they serviced the mortgages (i.e., sent bills and made monthly collections).9  Federal deposit 
                                                           
     8 Fannie and Freddie have only a modest involvement in multi-family (i.e., five or more units) 
residential mortgages; over 95% of their portfolio holdings and MBSs is devoted to single-family 
(i.e., one-to-four units) residential mortgages. 
     9 This "traditional" structure accounted for about 60% of mortgages in 1968 (Weicher 1994); the 
remainder were held by life insurance companies; pension funds; Fannie Mae; federal, state, and 
local agencies; finance companies; mortgage companies; and individuals.  For this non-traditional 
group, most originations occurred through third-party mortgage bankers. 
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insurance, provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to banks and the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to thrifts, provided guarantees to the 
depositor/liability holders. 
 Today, though the vertically integrated bank/thrift process is still important, the activities of 
Fannie and Freddie have created a second, vertically disintegrated process: mortgage bankers 
originate and briefly hold the mortgages; they sell the mortgages to Fannie or Freddie; the 
originators may choose to service the mortgages themselves or to sell the servicing rights to a third 
party servicer; Fannie and Freddie may hold the mortgages in their portfolios, financed by their 
debt; or they package them into MBSs and sell them to investors, so that the financing of the 
mortgages is coming from the purchasers of those MBSs; and Fannie and Freddie provide 
guarantees to those investor/liability holders (with the securities markets believing that the Federal 
Government will very likely stand behind those guarantees).10 
 Banks and thrifts have also become substantial suppliers of mortgages to Fannie and 
Freddie, thus electing to be less vertically integrated than the traditional process.  Banks and thrifts 
also purchase MBSs -- often exchanging mortgages for MBSs representing the same underlying 
mortgages -- and hold them in their portfolios, thereby gaining a more liquid mortgage asset with a 
credit guarantee and lower capital requirements, possibly no servicing complications, and the 
potential for greater geographical diversification than could be achieved from local mortgage 
originations.  The advantage of the lower capital requirement for holding these GSEs' MBSs can be 
readily seen from the following:  As was discussed in the text above, a group of residential 
mortgages would carry a 4% capital requirement for a bank or thrift, while these GSEs' MBSs 
(which could consist of the same mortgages, but carrying these GSEs' credit guarantee) carry only a 
                                                           
     10 Van Order (2000a, 2000b, 2000c) has formalized this notion of two alternative mortgage 
finance delivery mechanisms into a model of "dueling charters".  See Calomiris (1999) for a 
discussion and critique; see also the discussion in the text below. 
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1.6% capital requirement.  Fannie and Freddie currently charge an annual securitization fee of about 
20 basis points.  So long as the annual costs of equity are more than 833 basis points above the 
costs of debt (e.g., deposits) for a bank or thrift, a swap of mortgages for the equivalent GSEs' 
MBSs yields a financial gain.11 
 As of year-end 2000, Fannie and Freddie's mortgages-in-portfolio plus MBSs outstanding 
together accounted for the following percentages of the various categories of residential mortgages 
(USCBO 2001a): 
  39% of the $5.6 billion total of all residential mortgages 
  40% of the $5.2 billion total of all single-family (one-to-four units) mortgages12 
  48% of the $4.4 billion total of all single-family conventional mortgages13 
  60% of the $3.5 billion total of all single-family conforming mortgages14 
  71% of the $2.8 billion total of all fixed-rate single-family conforming mortgages.15 
 
3.  The larger context 
 The special statuses of Fannie and Freddie are not an aberration in the American economy.  
                                                           
     11 Let Ymort be the annual yield on a mortgage, Ymbs (= Ymort - 0.20) be the yield on the equivalent 
MBS, d be the annual (after-tax) cost of debt, and e be the annual cost of equity.  Then, if the capital 
(equity) requirement for holding a mortgage is 4% and the capital requirement for holding a GSE 
MBS is 1.6%, then holding the MBS is more profitable when 
 Ymbs - 0.984d - 0.016e > Ymort - 0.96d - 0.04e 
 Ymort - 0.20 - 0.984d - 0.016e > Ymort - 0.96d - 0.04e 
 0.024e > 0.024d + 0.20 
 e > d + 8.33 
     12 Excludes multi-family (five or more units) mortgages. 
     13 Excludes FHA- and VA-insured mortgages. 
     14 Excludes jumbo mortgages. 
     15 Excludes adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMS). 
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Instead, they are part of a much larger mosaic of long-standing public policies to encourage 
residential housing, including (past and present):16 
 -- Tax advantages: the non-recognition of the implicit income from housing by owner-
occupiers for income tax purposes;17 the exemption of owner-occupied housing from capital gains 
taxes; accelerated depreciation for rental housing; specific federal, state, and local subsidies and tax 
advantages for the construction of rental housing; 
 -- Federal, state, and local rent subsidization programs; 
 -- Direct governmental provision of rental housing ("public housing"); 
 -- Mortgage insurance, provided by HUD's Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and by 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA); 
 -- Securitization of FHA- and VA-insured mortgages by HUD's Government National 
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae); 
 -- Separate depository charters for institutions (thrifts) with mandates to invest in residential 
mortgages; 
 -- Favorable funding for thrifts and other depositories that focus on residential lending, 
through the Federal Home Loan Bank System (another GSE); 
 -- Federal deposit insurance for thrifts (formerly through the FSLIC, now through the FDIC) 
and for other depositories whose portfolios contain some mortgages. 
 It is possibly only a slight exaggeration to claim that when it comes to housing and 
especially home ownership, the ethos of public policy has been (and continues to be) "too much is 
                                                           
     16 For overviews, see, for example, Aaron (1972), Downs (1973), Weicher (1980), Mitchell 
(1985), and Rosen (1985). 
     17 The common perception of the tax advantage of home ownership is the deductibility of 
mortgage interest and local real estate taxes.  But, as Weicher and Woodward (1989) correctly 
argue, these deductions simply extend the basic advantage to those owner-occupiers who finance 
their home through debt rather than through equity (i.e., paying for it wholly with cash). 
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never enough". 
 
4.  What difference do they make? 
 The GSE status of Fannie and Freddie give them clear advantages, as compared with a non-
GSE.  They are supposed to use those advantages to reduce the cost of and expand residential 
finance.  What are the consequences? 
 Recent estimates (USCBO 2001a) of the reduced cost of Fannie and Freddie's debt place it 
at about 40 basis points; i.e., because of their "agency" status, Fannie and Freddie can issue debt at 
interest rates that are about 40 basis points less than could an otherwise similar non-GSE.18  These 
funding advantages vary positively with the length of maturity of a debt issue and have varied over 
time as conditions in the credit markets have varied.  Their MBSs similarly carry a yield that is 
about 30 basis points lower than non-GSE MBSs.  On the other side of the ledger, Freddie and 
Fannie's mortgage purchase activities appear to have reduced conforming mortgage interest rates by 
about 25 basis points (USCBO 2001b).19 
                                                           
     18 Since Standard and Poor's has recently rated both Fannie and Freddie as "AA-", an "otherwise 
similar" non-GSE would apparently be one that also had an AA- rating.  But, as is pointed out in 
USCBO (2001d), the S&P stress test and consequent rating is based on the criterion of "risk to the 
government" and assumes that the companies would continue to enjoy all of the advantages of their 
GSE status (except for the potential $2.25 billion Treasury loan); an otherwise similarly structured 
firm that was not a GSE would face higher funding costs immediately and throughout the period of 
the stress test, which might well imply a lower rating. 
     19 In the mid 1990s, the common estimates for the GSEs' advantage in debt funding were 40-70 
basis points, for their MBSs 30-40 basis points, and for their downward effects on conforming 
mortgages in the range of 25-35 basis points.  Advocates for Freddie and Fannie have disputed 
these past and present estimates and (not surprisingly) argue that the GSEs' funding advantage is 
smaller and their downward effect on conforming mortgages is larger; see, for example, Fannie 
Mae (2001b), Howard (2001a, 2001b), Pearce and Miller (2001a, 2001b), and Toevs (2001).  For a 
response, see USCBO (2001a, 2001c, 2001d).  For some important older studies, see Hendershott 
and Shilling (1989), Ambrose and Warga (1996), and Cotterman and Pearce (1996).  For 
summaries of these studies, see Feldman (1999), Kane (1999), and Seiler (2000). 
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 Historically, Fannie and Freddie have been important forces in creating a national funding 
market for mortgages and eroding local and regional differentials; in an important sense, they 
helped overcome structural barriers created by state laws that limited intra-state bank branching and 
forbade interstate branching, which were reinforced for national banks by the McFadden Act of 
1927 and the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.  Also, Fannie and 
Freddie were essential in creating the large secondary market in residential mortgages.  Though 
Ginnie Mae was the innovator in securitizing home mortgages in the late 1960s, Freddie Mac was a 
"fast second", issuing its first MBS in 1971; Fannie Mae, however, waited until 1981 before it 
issued its first MBS.  Both were quite active in the 1980s and 1990s.  By becoming securitizers, 
Freddie and Fannie were helping overcome another of the country's limitations on depository 
institutions: the Glass-Steagall Act's 1933 divorce of commercial banking from securities 
(investment banking) activities (Woodward 2001). 
 
5.  The dangers 
 Fannie and Freddie are exposed to at least three types of risks: 
 1) Credit risk.  On all of the mortgages that they hold in their portfolios and on all of their 
MBSs, Fannie and Freddie are exposed to the risks of default by the mortgage borrower. 
 2) Interest rate risk.  On all of the fixed interest rate mortgages20 that they hold in their 
portfolios,21 Fannie and Freddie are exposed to the risk that interest rates will rise, which will 
decrease the value of their assets (since the stream of future payments that the mortgages represent 
are discounted at the new, higher rate).  Further, the risks are asymmetric:  Since all of the 
mortgages give their holders the option to pre-pay (pay off the mortgage earlier than is contractually 
                                                           
     20 Only about 4.5% of Fannie's mortgage portfolio and 7.1% of Freddie's mortgage portfolio 
consist of adjustable rate mortgages. 
     21 The holders of the MBSs absorb the interest rate risk on those underlying mortgages. 
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stated), interest rate decreases are often accompanied by waves of pre-pays and refinancings (at the 
lower interest rates), so Freddie and Fannie do not experience comparable capital gains. 
 3) Operational risk.  This is the risk of poor management, bad judgments, employee fraud, 
etc. 
 As would be true for any well-managed company, Fannie and Freddie take extensive 
measures to contain these risks (Fannie Mae 2001; Freddie Mac 2001; Woodward 2001).  Indeed, 
both companies appear to be quite good at dealing with these risks.22  However, as is true for any 
limited liability company vis-a-vis its creditors, the owners (or the managers acting on their behalf) 
have an incentive to take additional risks (or to be less careful in dealing with risks), because they 
are limited in their exposure to the downside losses from the risk-taking:  Their stake in the 
company is the maximum that they can lose; the creditors absorb any further losses.23  It is the 
recognition of this potential for moral hazard behavior that has long caused bond holders and bank 
lenders to insist on restrictive covenants in bond indentures and restrictions in lending agreements. 
 If the capital markets are correct in their belief that the federal government would stand 
behind Fannie and Freddie's obligations in the event that either were in financial difficulties, 
however, then their creditors need not worry about any moral hazard behavior.  Instead, it is the 
federal government that is at risk.  In essence, this is a contingent liability for the federal 
government:  By guaranteeing those obligations, the government has absorbed the (negative value 
of the) "puts" that the creditors would otherwise have to worry about. 
                                                           
     22 In the early 1980s, however, Fannie Mae was insolvent on a mark-to-market basis, because it 
(like thousands of thrifts) had taken on excessive interest rate risk by lending long and borrowing 
short (i.e., investing in 30-year mortgages while funding itself through shorter-maturity debt 
obligations). 
     23 In essence, the creditors have granted a "put" to the owners.  Because of limited liability, the 
owners can "put" the company to the creditors by walking away.  The put is costly for the put 
grantor in the event that the enterprise becomes insolvent, since the assets then are insufficient to 
cover the liabilities. 
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 An upper bound to the annualized cost of this contingent liability is those 40 basis point 
differentials on these GSEs' debt and the 30 basis point differentials on their MBSs.  If these 
differentials are what Fannie and Freddie would have to pay the participants in the financial markets 
to absorb these risks in the absence of the government guarantee, they would thus approximate 
what the federal government would have to pay to get someone else to absorb the risks.  The total 
(for 2000) would be $8.0 billion.24  To the extent that a part of these differentials represent other 
aspects of these GSEs' operations and not a risk premium, the annual cost would be less.25 
 Whatever its size, it is an implicit cost.  It could be described as a "subsidy", since the 
federal government has provided an apparent guarantee (that has value to its recipients) and has 
assumed the concomitant contingent liability -- a cost -- without being reimbursed by Fannie and 
Freddie.  However, the use of the "subsidy" term has engendered confusion, since the subsidy is not 
overt or explicit26 and invites clouded sparring as to whether the "subsidy" should be measuring the 
federal government's costs or the favored parties' willingness to pay for the special opportunity that 
has been provided.  Instead, staying within the framework of the apparent guarantee and the 
concomitant contingent liability, and its estimated annualized cost, seems most appropriate for the 
purposes of this paper. 
                                                           
     24 The two GSEs had $1,081 billion in debt (x 40 basis points) plus $1,283 billion in MBSs 
outstanding (x 30 basis points). 
     25 For example, Gatti and Spahr (1997) estimate the federal government's contingent liability on 
Freddie Mac's MBSs, as of 1993, at about 8 basis points.  (If Gatti and Spahr's estimate held true for 
Fannie and Freddie's MBSs in 2000, then the remaining differential -- 22 basis points -- would 
represent the superior liquidity and other properties of these GSEs' MBSs.)  If applied to the 
aggregate of the $1,283 billion of Fannie and Freddie's MBSs outstanding at year-end 2000, this 
would imply an annualized governmental cost of only $1 billion (rather than the $3.85 billion that 
the 30 basis points would represent) and an overall cost of about $5.3 billion. 
     26 As the GSEs' advocates correctly claim, no government expenditure has thus far been required 
to support Fannie or Freddie.  But the same could have been said prior to 1989 with respect to the 
federal deposit insurance arrangement for the savings and loan industry.  The eventual taxpayer cost 
for the subsequent debacle (White 1991) was approximately $150 billion. 
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 The size of this contingent liability is partly exogenous -- how volatile will interest rates be? 
 how volatile will future macroeconomic conditions and homeowners' defaults be? -- and partly 
endogenous -- what is the size of these GSEs' direct liabilities and MBSs outstanding?  how careful 
are Fannie and Freddie in screening credit risks?  how adequate are their loan-loss reserves for 
covering expected losses?  how well do they hedge and offset (e.g., through options, match-
funding, issuing callable debt, etc.) their interest rate risk?  how much capital (net worth) do they 
have for covering unexpected losses?  Because of this endogeneity, government regulation -- safety-
and-soundness regulation, akin to that which applies to depositories -- is necessary to limit the 
federal government's exposure. 
 Only belatedly, however -- in 1992 -- did the government formally recognize this necessity. 
 The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (FHEFSSA)27 
created the OFHEO within HUD to conduct formal examinations of Fannie and Freddie and to 
establish capital requirements.  The Act established core capital requirements of 2.5% of assets28 
and 0.45% of outstanding MBSs and instructed OFHEO to develop a set of supplemental risk-
based capital standards based on forward-looking stress tests that assume ten years of extreme 
economic conditions (similar to those used by bond rating firms for their bond ratings).29  The 
original goal was for OFHEO to establish final rules within 18 months after the passage of the Act. 
 In practice the process took considerably longer:  The final rules were released in July 2001 and 
will take effect a year later. 
                                                           
     27 The FHEFSSA is embedded in (Title XIII of) the Housing and Community Development Act 
of 1992. 
     28 Recall that banks and thrifts are subject to a 4% capital requirement for holding residential 
mortgages. 
     29 See Gatti and Spahr (1997) and USOFHEO (2001b) for further descriptions.  The GSEs' 
minimum required capital will be the greater of the core capital requirement or the risk-based 
capital requirement. 
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6. The Social Significance of Home Ownership 
 The evaluation of the net or balance of Fannie's and Freddie's roles must be made in the 
larger context of housing policy in the U.S.  Recall that there are a panoply of policies that 
encourage housing, including policies that favor home ownership.30  The percentage of households 
that own their own homes is seen as an important social indicator.  The annually announced figure 
is an important political event, and trends and comparisons with earlier years are scrutinized 
carefully.31  In the 1990s, the goal of extending home ownership deeper into the ranks of "low- and 
moderate-income" households became more important.  As part of the FHEFSSA, HUD acquired 
the power to set goals for Fannie and Freddie to extend their mortgage purchase efforts so as to 
encompass more low- and moderate-income households. 
 There is a serious argument for encouraging home ownership:  There may well be positive 
externalities from owning rather than renting.  Moral hazard problems between landlord and tenant 
are eliminated, including issues related to the maintenance of the premises.  Though most of the 
gains from their elimination are internalized by the parties, the improved maintenance has positive 
externalities for the community.  Further, to the extent that homeowners care more about the 
community (because of the spillover effects for themselves), they may become more involved 
citizens.  There is an empirical literature that supports these and related notions (Rohe and Stegman 
1994; Rohe and Stewart 1996; Rossi and Weber 1996; Green and White 1997; DiPasquale and 
                                                           
     30 The policies that promote rental housing do nothing to encourage home ownership; if 
anything, home ownership is somewhat discouraged.  But rental housing policies are pursued as a 
way of supplementing the incomes of low- and moderate-income households.  As a general matter, 
a more effective way of supplementing their incomes would be to give them the equivalent cash 
directly (Aaron and von Furstenberg 1971; Muth 1973; Murray 1975; Kraft and Olsen 1977; 
Smeeding 1982). 
     31 The percentage of households owning their own homes rose throughout the 1990s (except for 
a dip in 1994), reaching an all-time high of 67.4% in 2000 (up from 63.9% in 1990). 
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Glaeser 1999).32 
 Thus, encouraging home ownership has a legitimate basis, although there clearly are limits. 
 Because of the substantial transactions costs in buying and then selling a home, as well as the 
inherent riskiness of a home as an investment, home ownership may well be inappropriate for 
households with high mobility, unstable employment and irregular incomes, or other impediments 
to meeting fixed debt obligations on a timely basis (Rohe and Stewart 1996; Rohe et al. 2000; 
McCarthy et al. 2000).  Further, because of these same costs, home ownership tends to lessen 
household mobility, which in turn has further costs to the household (e.g., in terms of flexibility in 
seeking new employment). 
 The logic of positive externalities from home ownership would call for a focused program 
that encouraged those households who would not otherwise buy (but for whom it is a close call) to 
purchase a home.  This focus should be on would-be first-time low- and moderate-income 
household buyers (Green and White 1994; White 1996; Calomiris 1999; Ely 2001) 
 Unfortunately, instead of exhibiting a tight focus, virtually all of the policy tools that are 
used to encourage home ownership, including the basic Fannie/Freddie program, are quite broad 
and blunt.  The result is that a great deal of encouragement for home ownership goes to households 
-- especially middle- and high-income households -- who would buy and own anyway but who are 
thereby encouraged to buy larger and better appointed homes and to buy second homes (that are 
larger and better appointed).33  The positive externalities from buying a bigger and better house 
and/or a second house are surely quite small, at best.  Further, to the extent that the supply curve for 
housing is less than perfectly elastic, some of the nominal encouragement is captured by sellers in 
the form of higher selling prices (White and White 1977). 
                                                           
     32 Rohe and Stewart (1996) has a review and bibliography of earlier studies. 
     33 For example, Rosen (1979) finds that taxing home owners' net imputed rent would have a 
substantially greater relative effect on the amount of house owned than on the percentage of 
households that decide to own. 
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 That the panoply of encouragements causes the stock of housing to be inefficiently larger 
than would otherwise be the case is evident.  Mills (1987a, 1987b) estimates that the housing stock 
is about 30% larger than if the encouragements were not present.34  With an excessively large 
housing stock (and insufficiently large stock of other productive capital), he finds that U.S. 
aggregate income is substantially lower -- about 10% -- than it otherwise could be.  Taylor (1998) 
finds that the condition of over-investment in housing persisted over the period 1975-1995: "...the 
unmeasured benefit to housing investment would have to top $220 billion per year (or $300 per 
month for each owner-occupied home) to support the current allocation of resources (Taylor 1998, 
p. 16)."  It is important to re-emphasize that the positive externality from housing attaches to the 
incidence of home ownership, not to the quantity of housing consumed. 
 
7. Reforming Housing Finance 
 Let us now address the status of Fannie and Freddie:  They borrow for less than would 
otherwise be the case; they cause conforming mortgages to cost/yield less than would otherwise be 
the case, thereby increasing the demand for residential (primarily single-family owner-occupied) 
housing; and they create a contingent liability for the federal government that would otherwise not 
be the case.  Further, there are the transactions costs: the costs of running Fannie and Freddie, the 
rents that their shareholders have likely earned (Hermalin and Jaffee 1996; White 1996, Seiler 
1999, 2000),35 and the costs of regulators and regulation. 
                                                           
     34 Hendershott (1986) estimates that, as of the mid 1980s, tax considerations alone encouraged a 
10% expansion of the housing stock.  See also Rosen (1985). 
     35 The annual return on equity from 1995 through 2000 averaged 24.3% for Fannie and 23.5% 
for Freddie.  Recall that they are the only two enterprises that are permitted to have their special 
federal charters.  The presence of rents, however, is a multi-faceted issue: (a) Rents are indicative of 
static allocative inefficiency; but (b) if one believes that the GSEs are part of a process that is 
already allocating too many resources to housing, rents mean a reduction in that mis-allocation; and 
(c) rents may provide the wherewithal for HUD to "lean" on the GSEs to expand their efforts in 
directions that they would otherwise find unprofitable; and (d) rents mean an increase in franchise 
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 We should start by assuming a zero-sum world36 and then look for positive externalities that 
would justify the special government treatment that Fannie and Freddie receive.37  As has been 
argued above, wider home ownership is a positive externality.  However, though the GSEs do lower 
the cost of home ownership modestly,38 their effect in inducing households who would not 
otherwise buy a home to do so must be yet more modest, since most of the encouragement that they 
provide must be to induce households who would be owner-occupiers anyway to buy a 
bigger/better appointed house and/or to buy a second house.39  As was noted above, in 2000 (when 
                                                                                                                                                             
value and a reduced incentive for owners to take risks. 
     36 More technically, we should start with a slightly negative-sum world, since the marginal 
social benefit from the consumption of additional housing will generally be below the marginal 
social cost of providing it.  Transfers between producers and consumers ought to be considered to 
be neutral, although (as has been discussed above) the political process has historically considered 
more (and lower-priced) housing as an unalloyed good thing rather than largely consisting of 
neutral transfers. 
     37 This effort does not neglect the efficiencies that the current managements are able to achieve 
but instead asks whether there are specific consequences of their special status and government 
support that permit actions and outcomes that would otherwise not be possible (or would be more 
costly) in the absence of their special status. 
     38 A reduction of 25 basis points on a mortgage that would otherwise carry an interest rate of 8% 
and that covers 80% of the purchase price of the home is effectively a 2-1/2% reduction in the cost 
of buying the home.  This percentage would be even less if we take into account (a) the after-tax 
effects; (b) any increase in the selling price that may have occurred because of the seller's 
capitalization of part of the GSE-caused lower interest cost; and (c) the other costs of home 
ownership (e.g., property taxes, insurance, utilities, and maintenance). 
     39 Recall the results from Rosen (1979), noted above.  Wachter et al. (1996) provide estimates of 
the effects of Fannie/Freddie privatization on home ownership rates.  They assume a 50 basis point 
effect on a base of a 10.12% mortgage rate, and they find a negative effect of 1.14 percentage points 
in the rate of home ownership.  However, a 25 basis point change on an 8% mortgage rate would be 
only 5/8 as great in relative magnitude, implying a decrease of 0.71 percentage points.  Though they 
find greater effects on targeted groups, it is unclear whether an increase in interest rates for 
conforming loans would affect low- and moderate-income home owners by as much as they 
indicate, since those groups are more likely to be using FHA or VA insured mortgages, on which 
interest rates would not change by as much, if at all. 
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the Fannie/Freddie conforming mortgage limit was $252,700) the median sales price for a new 
home was $168,500 and the median sales price for an existing home was $139,000; 80% loan-to-
value mortgages on those medians would have been $134,800 and $111,200, respectively.  Only 
17% of single-family mortgages outstanding in 2000 were jumbos -- i.e., above the conforming 
mortgage limit. 
 In 1992 the FHEFSSA instructed HUD to set specific goals with respect to affordable 
housing, encompassing: 
 -- a broad low- and moderate-income goal, for households with less-than-median income; 
 -- a geographically targeted goal for housing located in under-served areas, such as low-
income and high minority census tracts; and 
 -- a targeted income-based goal, for special affordable housing for very low-income 
households and low-income households living in low-income areas. 
 The goals were set,40 and Fannie and Freddie have met them (Fannie Mae 2001; Freddie 
Mac 2001).  But the extent to which these efforts have induced Fannie and Freddie to expand home 
ownership beyond what otherwise would have occurred is unclear.  Detailed studies (McClure 
2001; Pearce 2001; Williams et al. 2001) indicate that the targets may be sufficiently broad so that 
meeting them is not a strain,41 and that these GSEs' efforts with respect to low income households 
and areas tended to lag behind those of local portfolio lenders. 
 These efforts to "lean" on Fannie and Freddie are similar in spirit to the efforts of the 
                                                           
     40 For more details, see Pearce (2001). 
     41 E.g., the GSEs may be "cherry picking" the best risks within a designated group or area, who 
they would be lending to anyway; see Calomiris (1999).  Also, they may be simply learning about 
extending their purchases into new, somewhat riskier markets that require new but profitable 
underwriting skills; see Quercia et al. (1998).  And, as Wachter et al. (1996) point out, the GSEs are 
meeting some of their targeted goals through multi-family lending, which may be beneficial to low- 
and moderate-income households but does not promote home ownership and may even undercut it 
somewhat. 
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Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) to induce banks and thrifts to "meet the credit needs" 
of their local communities, and the same drawbacks are present (White 1993; White 2000b, 2002a). 
 Efforts to force lenders to extend credit, directly or indirectly (i.e., via the GSEs) confront an 
essential conundrum:42  If the lending opportunities are profitable, the lenders should be already 
lending without any external pressure, so the pressure is redundant (and there are always costs of 
monitoring and reporting); if the opportunities are unprofitable, then either the efforts require a 
cross-subsidy from activities with above-normal profits (rents), or they will be evaded (cynical 
shirking), or they will place the enterprise in financial difficulties.  As financial markets become 
more competitive, the wherewithal for cross-subsidy disappears, and one of the latter two 
possibilities become likely. 
 Fannie and Freddie may be a special case where "leaning on" might have a chance, since 
their special charters and advantages are likely allowing them to earn rents (Hermalin and Jaffee 
1996; White 1996; Seiler 1999, 2000).  Still, this route involves pressure on an organization to take 
actions (make loans) that are believed to be unprofitable and that thereby rasp against the grain of a 
profit-seeking enterprise, with managerial fiduciary obligations to its stockholders.43  It is surely a 
recipe for political struggles and foot-dragging generally.  Far better would be a direct, targeted 
program that directly addresses the externality (as will be discussed below). 
 Are there other positive externalities from the government chartering of Fannie and 
                                                           
     42 The spirit of the CRA and of the FHEFSSA's instructions to HUD is that there are potentially 
profitable customers among the targeted groups or areas who somehow are not being served.  This 
belief is hard to reconcile with a model of aggressive profit-seeking lenders.  Also, it is important to 
note that the CRA and the FHEFSSA are not focused on issues of racial discrimination, which is 
the province of the Equal Opportunity Lending Act of 1975. 
     43 This is different from the legal mandates, say, to avoid discrimination against customers, 
suppliers, or employees on the basis of race or gender -- e.g., as embodied (for lending) in the Equal 
Opportunity Lending Act of 1975 -- since these do not raise direct issues of profitability and should 
be more readily instilled in a corporate culture as "the right thing to do". 
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Freddie?  Two candidates have been advanced.  First, Woodward (2001) argues that the (implicit) 
government guarantee permits Fannie and Freddie to issue a blanket guarantee on all their MBSs 
that removes issues of credit risk from the minds of MBS investors, thereby eliminating the 
transactions costs of credit/information research in which MBS investors would otherwise engage.  
By contrast, for "private label" MBSs (of jumbo mortgages), their issuers secure favorable (AA or 
AAA) bond ratings for the MBSs by creating two classes of bonds -- senior and subordinated -- that 
are supported by the underlying mortgages.  The subordinated bonds are those that absorb the first 
fraction of any losses up to the limit of their nominal value, and only then are further losses 
absorbed by the senior bonds.  The latter are the MBSs that receive the favorable ratings (and are 
suitable for investment by financial institutions), while the former are considered quite risky and 
require a selective clientele, such as hedge funds.  The rating process itself absorbs resources 
(transactions costs), and investors will be further concerned as to whether some subordinated MBSs 
have absorbed greater losses, which would imply greater risks for the associated senior MBSs, 
entailing further monitoring (transactions) costs.  The Fannie/Freddie process eliminates these 
costs. 
 This argument is surely correct; but offsetting the gains is the contingent liability of the 
federal government.  The argument is reminiscent of one of the major arguments supporting 
federally provided deposit insurance: reducing the transactions costs for poorly informed liability 
(deposit) holders in determining which banks are safe or risky.  And, of course, the federal 
government also bears a contingent liability for that guarantee.  But deposit insurance also has the 
important function of preventing (ill-informed) depositor runs on otherwise solvent banks and 
thereby stabilizing the banking and monetary system (Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Postlewaite and 
Vives 1987; Chen 1999).  And deposit insurance provides a simple and safe haven for depositors' 
funds.  The argument concerning reducing transactions in the secondary mortgage market does not 
carry a similar larger stabilizing or social purpose. 
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 The other potential positive externality arises in the context of Van Order's (2000a, 2000b, 
2000c) model of "dueling charters", in which he reminds us that depositories that fund residential 
mortgages and hold them in portfolio also have a government guarantee (deposit insurance).  If the 
depositories are inherently a less (socially) efficient means of financing mortgages than are the 
GSEs, then the expansion of the GSEs (at the depositories' expense) reduces social inefficiency.  
However, though the innovation of mortgage securitization has clearly revolutionized mortgage 
finance and would persist even without the favored status of the GSEs, the assumed inherent 
superior efficiency of Fannie and Freddie may not be valid.  Recall that for mortgages held in 
portfolio, the GSEs have a substantial regulatory advantage: a 2-1/2% capital requirement as 
opposed to the depositories' 4% requirement.  This differential is surely part of the reason of the 
substantial expansion of the GSEs' mortgages held as on-balance sheet assets and the substantial 
reductions in thrifts' holdings of mortgages.  Also, as was discussed above, depositories' regulatory 
capital requirements provide them with an incentive to hold the GSEs' MBSs rather than holding 
mortgages. 
 As for the depositories' government guarantee (federal deposit insurance), the discussion 
above indicated that deposit insurance itself carries substantial positive externalities.  And the 
contingent liability of the federal government has been substantially reduced, as compared with two 
decades ago, because of higher capital requirements that are somewhat risk-based, prompt 
corrective action mandates, and larger reserves in the deposit insurance fund.44  Also, the specially 
treated depository category of federally insured thrift institution, with a heavy emphasis on portfolio 
mortgage lending, has become substantially diluted and weakened since 1989.  Total assets for all 
thrifts declined by 18% between 1989 and 2000; and at year-end 2000 thrifts held less than a third 
                                                           
     44 Safety-and-soundness of depositories could be improved further, however, with the use of 
market value accounting, the mandatory issuance of subordinated debt, and the use of forward-
looking stress tests (White 1991, 2002b). 
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of their assets as non-MBS single-family residential mortgage loans, substantially below the 1989 
fraction.  That duel is largely over. 
 In sum, the positive externalities and thus true social benefits provided by Fannie and 
Freddie are surely positive but modest.  If the status of Fannie and Freddie could be considered in 
isolation, the policy recommendation to privatize them -- i.e., remove all explicit/formal and 
implicit government support45 -- would be an easy one.46  Given their substantial brand-name 
reputation and the impressive collection of human/intellectual capital bound in the two firms, they 
would likely continue to innovate and prosper, with their relative funding costs a bit higher than is 
currently the case,47 their MBSs yielding a bit more, and the costs for home buyers of obtaining a 
residential mortgage rising a bit.  In turn, the government's contingent liability would be gone. 
 In their place, the federal government should institute a targeted program to encourage 
home ownership for first-time buyers among low- and moderate-income households.  This would 
be a far more direct way of addressing the positive externality of home ownership.  The 
encouragement should apply both to reducing down payments (Calomiris 1999) and interest costs 
(Ely 2001).  The costs of the program would, and should, be explicit.  Further, as a way of reducing 
the costs of housing more generally, governments at all levels ought to focus on supply-side 
                                                           
     45 There is the non-trivial question of whether, even with all formal and informal ties broken, the 
financial markets would consider such large firms to be "too-big-too-fail"; i.e., despite any formal 
ties, the federal government would not permit a fully private Fannie or Freddie to fail to meet its 
obligations.  But this question applies to any large firm in the U.S. economy.  It has been 20 years 
since the last explicit "bail-out" of a major firm: the federal government's loan guarantees for 
Chrysler. 
     46 Ely (2001) offers some details for a potential privatization.  However, his plan for also 
requiring the divestiture of parts of the companies as part of the privatization process does not seem 
warranted, since potential economies of scale and scope might well be sacrificed. 
     47 To the extent that the Fannie/Freddie advocates are correct in claiming that the estimates of 
their funding advantage overstate the true benefit from being a GSE, the increase in their funding 
costs following privatization would be smaller. 
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considerations (Weicher 1980), such as modifying restrictive land zoning (which reduces housing 
supply by limiting the ability to build single-family houses on small lots and limits the building of 
multi-family units), modifying building codes that unnecessarily raise housing costs without adding 
to housing safety, and avoiding restrictive international trade policies that raise the prices of 
important inputs into housing, such as lumber (Simon 2001). 
 Without their special charters, Fannie and Freddie's role in the (formerly) conforming 
mortgage segment would diminish somewhat; how much would depend on how much of those 
differentials discussed above are due to their special status and how much to their superior 
practices.  But, also, freed of the restrictions that accompany their current status, Fannie and Freddie 
would likely vertically integrate into related areas (e.g., mortgage insurance, title insurance, 
appraisals, originations) and expand horizontally into related areas of finance (e.g., jumbo mortgage 
loans, sub-prime mortgage loans, personal finance loans, auto loans, credit card loans, perhaps even 
commercial real estate) where their credit assessment and securitization skills could work to their 
advantage.48  They might well have the capability to continue to offer blanket guarantees on their 
MBSs (rather than doing senior/subordinated structures), thereby solving the transactions cost 
problem discussed above.  Private entities now engage in "private label" housing MBS finance, as 
well as securitizations of auto loans, personal finance loans, credit card loans, commercial mortgage 
loans, and a widening array of other asset-backed finance vehicles.  A privatized Freddie and 
Fannie would simply join them.49 
                                                           
     48 With privatization, the nagging controversy concerning their recent and current efforts to 
expand into related areas -- are they taking these actions because they are inherently more efficient 
than the rivals that they are displacing? or are they just taking further advantage of their artificially 
low costs of funding? -- would disappear.  These controversies have encompassed these GSEs' 
expansions into non-mortgage financial investments, subprime mortgages, automated underwriting 
systems, mortgage insurance, and appraisals, as well as just the substantial expansion of their on-
balance-sheet portfolios of residential mortgages in the 1990s (McKinley 2000; White 2000a; 
Wallison and Ely (2000).  For the most recent controversy, concerning appraisals, see Barta (2001). 
     49 Though their special status may well have helped Fannie and Freddie in originally establishing 
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 But Fannie and Freddie do not exist in isolation but in the middle of the extensive policy 
support for housing listed above.  If somehow Fannie and Freddie were privatized, then what about 
the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS) and especially the FHLBS's recent initiative to offer 
its members a mortgage finance program -- its Mortgage Partnership Finance (MPF) program50 -- 
that is somewhat similar to and competitive with (albeit much smaller than) the Fannie/Freddie 
purchases of mortgages?  And what other adjustments in the mortgage finance system might 
accompany the privatization of Fannie and Freddie? 
 First, privatization of the FHLBS logically ought to accompany any privatization of Fannie 
and Freddie, for basically the same reasons (Ely 2001; Stanton 2001).  Second, as Woodward 
(2001) points out, in the wake of a Fannie/Freddie privatization, FHA insurance would likely 
expand, and mortgage finance by depositories would likely expand; both would increase the federal 
government's contingent liabilities somewhat -- but surely not by as much as the Fannie/Freddie and 
FHLBS privatizations would reduce it. 
 Despite some offsets, the privatization of Fannie and Freddie would still make sense and 
would constitute an important first step toward rationalizing U.S. housing policy.51 
 A general rationalization of U.S. housing policy may well be a quixotic goal, however.  
Public and political sentiment shows few signs of turning away from the notion that more housing 
is always a good thing, even if middle- and high-income households are the primary beneficiaries.  
If privatization of Fannie and Freddie is not a realistic political option, then rigorous and vigorous 
                                                                                                                                                             
the secondary market for MBS and in effectively unifying the national market for residential 
mortgage finance, government support is clearly no longer necessary for these activities to continue. 
     50 See the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago's website: www.fhlbc.com. 
     51 The next steps, besides privatizing the FHLBS, would be the phasing-out of the widespread 
tax favoritism for housing and the expansion of income support for low-income households through 
expansion of the earned income tax credit (EITC), so that they could expand their consumption of 
goods and services generally rather than restricting their benefit to the consumption of housing. 
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safety-and-soundness regulation must be pursued, so as to minimize the federal government's 
contingent liability.52  The essential components of such regulation are the same as those that ought 
to be part of depositories' safety-and-soundness regulation: market value accounting; minimum 
risk-based capital requirements, based on market value accounting and using forward-looking stress 
tests; the required issuance of subordinated debt;53 and the staged tightening of regulatory 
restrictions ("prompt corrective action") as the regulated entity's capital erodes.  Although "the devil 
is in the details" (and in the enforcement), OFHEO's final risk-based regulation appears to be 
headed in a sensible direction.  Further, the voluntary disclosure and other actions that Fannie and 
Freddie committed to in October 2000 should be continued:54 
 -- issue subordinated debt55 
 -- maintain adequate liquidity 
 -- implement and disclose a risk-based capital stress test until OFHEO's final risk-based 
capital regulations are implemented 
 -- publicly disclose interest rate risk sensitivity analyses on a monthly basis 
                                                           
     52 Seiler (1999) suggests expanded "economic regulation", treating Fannie and Freddie as public 
utilities and possibly encompassing rate-of-return regulation.  This suggestion seems extreme, 
especially given the poor experience that the American economy has had with much of public 
utility regulation, especially when competitive pressures are present; see, for example, Phillips 
(1975); Weiss and Klass (1981, 1986), Joskow and Rose (1989), Winston (1993), and Joskow and 
Noll (1994).  Though privatization would be far better, effective safety-and-soundness regulation 
and the expansion of the FHLBSs' MPF program should go a long way toward dealing with the 
problems that Seiler raises. 
     53 Any subordinated debt issued by the GSEs ought truly to be subordinated to the federal 
government's interests and ought not to be eligible to be "bailed out" by any Treasury rescue of the 
GSEs (Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee 2001). 
     54 Further details can be found in Fannie Mae (2001a) and Freddie Mac (2001). 
     55 The precept that the debt ought truly to be subordinated to the interests of the federal 
government should be followed. 
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 -- publicly disclose credit risk sensitivity analyses on a quarterly basis 
 -- annually obtain and publicly disclose a financial rating that would indicate the "risk to the 
government" or independent financial strength of the companies.56 
 In a context in which Fannie and Freddie continue more-or-less as they are today (albeit 
more effectively regulated), what should be the fate of the FHLBS's MPF program?  If it is 
successful, the MPF program would offer additional competition for Fannie and Freddie, which 
should generally be worthwhile.  It may, however, represent a further expansion of the 
government's indirect (via GSEs) expansion into residential housing finance and an enlargement of 
its contingent liability.  Whether it would make more difficult any future privatization is unclear.  
Though an expanded MPF program would add the FHLBS as an interested party in the secondary 
mortgage area, the privatization of the FHLBS ought to accompany any privatization of Fannie and 
Freddie, and an expanded MPF program does not affect this logic.  But with greater competition, 
the rents currently earned by Fannie and Freddie would likely decline, and they might be more 
amenable to privatization.57  On balance, the benefits of greater competition are more tangible, and 
the expansion of the MPF program, provided that it is otherwise sound, ought not to be hindered. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 The roles of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and housing finance more generally are 
                                                           
     56 Both Fannie and Freddie have obtained AA- ratings from Standard & Poors.  However, as is 
pointed out in USCBO (2001d), the S&P stress test and consequent rating assumes that the 
companies would continue to enjoy all of the advantages of their GSE status (except for the 
Treasury loan); an otherwise similarly structured firm that was not a GSE would face higher 
funding costs immediately and throughout the period of the stress test, which might well imply a 
lower rating. 
     57 Expanded competition, by reducing the GSEs' rents, will make even more difficult and more 
painful HUD's efforts to "lean" on Fannie and Freddie to extend their purchases to targeted groups 
and areas. 
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embedded in a much larger set of housing programs and policies in the U.S.  There is a legitimate 
goal -- expanding home ownership -- that housing programs could pursue.  But they currently 
pursue that goal diffusely and indirectly, rather than in a targeted manner.  As a direct consequence 
of these diffuse policies, the U.S. housing stock is inefficiently large, while the stock of other 
productive capital is inefficiently too small, and U.S. incomes suffer.  Any proposed changes in 
housing finance clearly occur within the realm of the second-best. 
 Public policy continues to face a choice as to how Fannie and Freddie will be treated.  They 
could continue to stay in their current unique and exclusive GSE positions, as part of the overall 
package of "too much is never enough" housing policies that the American polity continues to 
pursue.  Better-focused safety-and-soundness regulation appears to be on the way, which is all to 
the good; the federal government's contingent liability should be reduced as much as possible.  But 
the goal of expanding home ownership will continue to be pursued only indirectly.  HUD will 
continue to "lean" on the two GSEs to do more for targeted groups; when the leaning starts to hurt, 
they will surely resist. 
 Or Fannie and Freddie could be privatized.  The implicit costs of the contingent liability that 
the federal government bears would cease and should be replaced with an explicit program to help 
low- and moderate-income households become first-time buyers.  Fannie and Freddie would be 
fully freed to pursue whatever strategies best fit their management structures and expertises and 
best serve their shareholders; a continuation of their prominent roles in secondary mortgage markets 
would surely be central to those strategies. 
 It is this latter route of privatization that should be pursued.  Disentangling Fannie and 
Freddie from that larger framework will not be easy.  But it is a task that is worth attempting. 
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 Table 1: Balance Sheet and MBS Data, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 1980-2000 
 (in billions of dollars) 
 
   Fannie Mae    |   Freddie Mac 
        | 
   Retained    |   Retained 
 Total  mortgage     MBSs  | Total  mortgage     MBSs 
 assets  portfolioa outstandingb  | assets  portfolioa outstandingb 
 
1980  $57.9  $55.6    $0.0      $5.5      $5.0     $17.0 
 
1985   99.1   94.1    54.6      16.6      13.5        99.9 
 
1990  133.1  114.1   288.1        40.6      21.5     316.4 
 
1995  316.6  252.9   513.2      137.2       107.7     459.0 
 
2000  675.1  607.6   706.7     459.3       385.5     576.1 
 
a Includes repurchased MBSs. 
b Excludes MBSs that are held in portfolio. 
 
Source: USOFHEO (2001a). 
